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DIVORCING GENDER FROM MARRIAGE:
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE ON THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
TRANSGENDERED MARRIAGE
Abstract
Sex is an immutable characteristic; says who? As transgendered people and LGBTQQ (lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning) issues gain more traction and recognition, the clear contours of sex and
gender are fading, and a more fluid concept of gender is emerging. However, the American legal system lags behind
the mutability of gender in an environment where the conceptualization and understanding of gender is becoming ever
more nuanced and complex. This is most apparent in the law’s treatment of transgendered marriage: a marriage
involving at least one person who identifies as transgendered. A transgendered person can be defined as a person who
identifies as a gender that is different than the gender assigned based on his or her sex at birth, inclusive of those who
have or have not transitioned, had sex-reassignment surgery, executed a name change, or modified the gender marker
on his or her legal documents. The law’s rigid response to the complications that transgendered marriage presents in
the wake of unlawful same-sex marriage, is to wholly negate the importance of recognizing gender, and instead, to
look primarily to a person’s sex for guidance.
This article explores the jurisprudence underpinning lawful and null transgendered marriages from a feminist
perspective. Specifically, it describes the history and current state of jurisprudence as it relates to transgendered
marriage. This review of the legal landscape identifies the law’s sex-based thresholds for defining gender, which result
in the validation or invalidation of a transgendered marriage. Analyzing these thresholds implicates the way in
which the law serves to control gender identity and reinforces traditional gender roles in society. This in turn reveals
the insidious undercurrent of bias and patriarchy permeating the annals of the justice system as it relates to gender
and transgendered identity. Ultimately, this article exposes the woefully inadequate state of jurisprudence today as it

relates to transgendered marriage and gender, and posits that this is due in large part to non-lgbptqq1 identifying,
white male dominance.

1

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, poly sexual, transgender, queer, and questioning.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper explores transgendered marriage in order to expose the inherent bias and
patriarchy that leaves the jurisprudence of transgendered marriage in flux and chaos. Specifically,
it uses a three-part framework for understanding how gender is controlled in cases involving
transgendered marriage. This three-part framework, in part, is based upon the thresholds that
courts use to validate and invalidate transgendered marriage, and acts as a tool to explore the harm
and inequity present in transgendered jurisprudence. Part I explains the gender binary and
provides guiding definitions of the terms transgender and transgender marriage. Part II reviews the
history and current state of courts’ treatment of transgendered marriage through the three-part
framework that the paper identifies. The first limb of the framework explains the manner in which
biological designation of gender or assignment of sex at birth is controlling; the second discusses
the ability to consummate a marriage as evidence of the marriage’s validity; and, the third concerns
gender marker changes on legal documents or sex reassignment surgery as factors to determine the
validity of a marriage. Part III analyzes the ways in which courts control gender formation,
identity, and social binary-gender conformation, in addition to the subsequent harm this causes.
Lastly, Part IV explores the ways in which transgendered jurisprudence is motivated by patriarchy,
which results in bias and inequitable treatment of transgendered persons. In short, the state of
transgendered jurisprudence controls gender identity and formation in harmful ways, and uses
marriage as a perverse tool to perpetuate the gender binary and patriarchal control.
I.

EXPLORING THE GENDER-BINARY AS IT RELATES TO
TRANSGENDERED MARRIAGE
A. The Gender Binary
The gender binary, a rigid western conception that gender is comprised only of two

biological sexes, is eroding. Unpacking gender and discovering its rich complexities and
multidimensional continuum of possibilities is nothing new for anthropologists and historians who
3

have documented countless examples of individuals living outside of the scope of the genderbinary. Not surprisingly, the concept of the gender binary is imploding in the United States as
attention to the mutability of gender increases in pop culture, media, and politics. However, the
American legal system lags behind this progress, and fails to recognize the mutability of gender,
including unfixed gender roles. In fact, the American legal system openly constrains the construct2
of gender, and thereby the formation of gender identity, to the gender binary— a patriarchaldominant construction. This lag is most evident when examining the jurisprudence of
transgendered marriage.
The alternative is to define gender in a multidimensional and non-linear capacity, where a
gender spectrum is not merely a line between male and female, but a circle with various points of
gender that are not linearly related.3 Conversely, the gender binary presupposes and reinforces the
notion that sex and gender are predetermined: that sex is biologically determined and that gender
is socially constructed.4 The dangers of this construction are that it gives sex more legitimacy
because it is assigned by a neutral third party at birth, as opposed to gender which can be/is selfidentified. Thus, self- determined gender can be mistrusted and considered less legitimate.5 This
bias is reflected in courts’ treatment of transgendered marriage; particularly where judges recognize
biological sex as opposed to self-identified gender as a mechanism for legitimizing or
delegitimizing marriages involving transgendered persons, further discussed in Part II.
B. Transgendered Marriage Defined

FAQ: if “gender is a social construct”, aren’t feminists saying that gender doesn’t really exist at all?, FINALLY, A
FEMINIST 101 BLOG (July 21, 2008), http://finallyfeminism101.wordpress.com/2008/07/21/faq-if-gender-is-a-socialconstruct-arent-feminists-saying-that-gender-doesnt-really-exist-at-all.
3 See Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward A Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That Is More
Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 261 (2005) (describing a three-dimensional non-linear space
termed the “gender galaxy”).
4 Id.
5 Id.
2
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To understand the concept of what this paper terms transgendered marriage, it is most
important to think about what it means to be transgendered. The fluidity of gender makes it
inherently difficult to adequately and comprehensively define what it means to be transgendered.
For the sake of clarity, “transgendered” is defined for purposes of this paper as a person’s
identification as a gender beyond or opposite of the biological sex assigned at birth. This is broad,
and purposefully so, because transgendered persons defy and transcend gender stereotypes, unlike
persons who identify their gender within the neat contours of the traditional binary-gender
classification system. Arguably, sex and gender are biologically and socially constructed, and so
this definition makes specific use of the word assigned as it pertains to sex. To be transgendered
can mean many, often disparate, things and can manifest itself in varying ways. Some posit that to
be transgendered is to encompass all genders, though others would disagree. 6 For instance, some
male-to-female (MTF) transgender persons are masculine lesbians, while some female-to-male
(FTM) transgender persons are masculine heterosexual.7 Some transgender persons do not
identify as either female or male, but as a third or other gender, such as ‘trans’, ‘boy-girl’, ‘shinjuku
boy’8, ‘boi’, ‘girl-boy-girl’, ‘third gender’, ‘fourth gender’, ‘no gender’, or ‘bi-spirit.’.9 As Dylan
Vade notes, “[s]ome transgender people choose to alter their bodies medically and some do not.
Some transgender people want to alter their genitalia, and some do not. The ways to be
transgender are endless.” 10
With this in mind, ‘transgendered marriage’ is the concept of a marriage involving a
person who identifies as transgendered and another person, who may identify as being gay,
transgendered, straight, lesbian, queer, bisexual, pansexual, or questioning. Marriage for purposes
Id.
Vade, supra note 4, at 261.
8 SHINJUKU BOYS (Second Run DVD, 1995). (This documentary follows three “onnabes” through their lives in Tokyo,
Japan. Onnabes are women who live their lives as men and have girlfriends, but do not typically identify as lesbians).
9 Vade, supra note 4, at 260-61.
10 Id.
6
7
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of this article includes marriages recognized by the state at one point in time, even if later
invalidated by the judiciary. This definition guides the exploration of the jurisprudence of
transgendered marriage, and acts as a conduit to explore and uncover the ways in which patriarchal
notions of the gender binary are deeply anchored in the American legal system.
II.

THE HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF TRANSGENDERED MARRIAGE

To understand the prevailing treatment of transgendered marriage by courts, it is important
to distinguish between sex and gender. While some posit that there should not be a distinction
between sex and gender because such a distinction denies legitimacy to some transgendered
persons, each term is defined separately in this article precisely because this is the paradigm under
which United States courts operate.11
Olga Tomchin provides a useful definition of ‘sex’ as “the legal fiction that occurs when the
appearance of an infant's genitals at birth (as formalized by an “M” or “F” on a birth certificate)
results in each person's placement into a legal category of “male” or “female.12 While gender is
broadly defined by Julia Greenberg as “the cultural or attitudinal qualities . . . characteristic of a
particular sex.”13
With these distinctions in mind, three predominant approaches guide courts in their
treatment of transgendered marriage: 1) A biological designation of gender or assignment of sex at
birth as controlling legal gender identity, and thereby recognizing or nullifying a marriage 2) the
ability to consummate a marriage as evidence of the marriage’s validity, and 3) having a gender
marker change on a legal document or sex reassignment surgery as a factor or determining factor
See Vade, supra note 4, at 262 (the distinction of sex and gender by courts is posited to be harmful to transgendered
persons. Specifically, this dichotomy gives sex more important, making it more real; thus, a transgendered person’s self
identification of gender is less legitimate).
12 Olga Tomchin, Bodies and Bureaucracy: Legal Sex Classification and Marriage-Based Immigration for Trans* People, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 813, 824 (2013).
13 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265
(1999).
11
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to validate a marriage. These three methods guide the analysis of the ways in which the legal
system controls gender identity formation and identification through the jurisprudence of
transgendered marriage. Most importantly, these differing approaches signify a split in the judicial
system’s treatment of like people— an obvious equal protection violation, and evidence of lurking
bias and patriarchal influence, discussed further in Part IV.
Currently the state of the jurisprudence of transgendered marriage is one in flux. The
judicial system lacks a uniform approach by which to classify legitimate marriage when one party is
transgendered. As a result, there is a lack of predictability as to whether a person’s marriage, birth
certificate, gender-marker change, or sex-reassignment surgery will be legally recognized or
discriminated against. Specifically, even once a person can change his or her legal sex designation
in a state, there is no full faith and credit extended to this modification in other states.14 A state’s
respective policy as it relates to recognizing gender identity and the various implications that such
recognition, or lack thereof, may have on a person’s life is largely left to the state legislature; such
legislative deference is thus used as a mechanism by the judiciary to skirt equal protection violation
arguments brought by transgendered persons.15
These variances in the law disadvantage transgendered persons and their families, while
simultaneously facilitating formal discrimination. Essentially, courts only designate status to
transgendered people who fit narrow gender stereotypes, engage in heterosexual sex, or medically
alter their bodies; and even then, some court’s refuse to recognize self-identified gender, thus
denying transgendered people dignity.16 Virtually no case law exists where a court accepts without

Alice Newlin, Should A Trip from Illinois to Tennessee Change A Woman into A Man? : Proposal for A Uniform Interstate Sex
Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 463 (2008).
15 Id. See also In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).
16 Vade, supra note 4, at 253, 256 (2005).
14
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question a person’s self-identified gender and/or sex.17 The following cases, analyzed through the
three-part framework, demonstrate this failure by exposing the variances in the law.
A. Biology and Assignment of Sex at Birth as an Immutable Determination of Legal Gender
One of the most influential cases in the history of transgendered marriage jurisprudence is a
1970’s English case by the name of Corbett v. Corbett. 18 The Corbett case was the first English case
in which a court determined whether a transgendered person could legally marry under his or her
self-identified gender. 19 In Corbett, the transgendered party, April Ashley, underwent sexreassignment surgery to transition from being male to female, and began taking estrogen. 20 Three
years after her transition, Ashley married a man, but shortly after the marriage ceremony each
sought an annulment on grounds of willful refusal, or inability to consummate the marriage. 21
The presiding judge, notably a doctor, held that sex is determined at birth, and is an immutable
characteristic unable to be altered medically or legally later in life. 22 This irrefutable biological
designation of “legal” sex and gender completely strips an individual of the right to form selfidentified gender. However, the Corbett court’s reasoning was relied upon in several of the first
cases in the U.S. involving transgendered marriage, and has not entirely disappeared from
American jurisprudence.23 Two such cases are Anonymous v. Anonymous, and In re Ladrach; both
cited respectively over 200 times and still considered valid case law.24

Vade, supra note 4, at 253, 256 (2005).
Corbett v. Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33.
19 Notes, 5 Ottawa L. Rev. 583 (1971-1972).
20 Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33.
21 Id.
22 Alice Newlin, Should A Trip from Illinois to Tennessee Change A Woman into A Man? : Proposal for A Uniform Interstate Sex
Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 468-69 (2008); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Prob.
1987); Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33.
23 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265,
299-300 (1999).
24 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1971); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 828.
17
18
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Anonymous v. Anonymous is the first United States case to determine the validity of
transgendered marriage.25 In Anonymous, a 1971 New York case, the plaintiff testified that he did
not know he had married a man, despite having spent time with his soon-to-be wife at a
“prostitution house” in late 1968.26 Perhaps even less believable was his testimony that three
months of time elapsed in which he never saw her unclothed, nor had sexual relations with her.27
The court adopted the facts that the evening following the wedding ceremony the drunken groom
reached for his new wife while in bed and discovered that she had a penis.28 The wife told the
husband that she planned to have sex-reassignment surgery, which she in fact had performed in
1970.29 The husband traveled overseas for the army, but remained in contact with the wife.30
Between the years of 1969 and 1970, the husband received the wife’s medical bills, shared a
portion of his military pay with her, and bailed her out from jail on a prostitution charge.31 Finally
in the spring of 1970, the husband petitioned for divorce in New York. The Anonymous Court
found that the parties never lived together nor had a sexual relationship.32 The court held that the
marriage was invalid.33 It reasoned that in fact the defendant was not a female, but male at the time
of the ceremony, and despite her sex reassignment surgery and self-identification as female, she
was legally a male.34 Further, the court reasoned, “mere removal of the male organs, would not, in

Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
34 Id.
25
26
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and of itself, change a person into a true female.”35 Like Corbett,36 the court implicitly viewed sex
as unequivocally biologically determined.37
Similarly, in In re Ladrach, a 1987 Ohio case, the court heavily relied on Corbett to uphold the
lower court’s refusal to issue a marriage license to a transgendered person. 38 Here, a MTF
transgendered person sought to marry a male after having had sex-reassignment surgery.39 In an
attempt to obtain her marriage license, the MTF transgendered person applied for and was denied
a change of gender on her birth certificate.40 Instead, to obtain the marriage license, she was
forced to seek a declaratory judgment that she was female.41 The court reasoned that because the
marriage applicant had male genitalia at birth and there was no chromosomal evidence denying
that the person was still male, the MTF transgendered person would remain legally male. 42 It
further reasoned that a person’s “true sex” is the sex biologically determined and assigned at birth;
not self-identified, not post-operative— determined singularly by biology.43 Note that this case
does not preclude a transgendered person from marrying someone of their same self-identified
gender, and then later transition to the same sex as their spouse.44 Considering this outcome, the
desire to constrain gender to the gender binary and biological sex creates paradoxes in the law.
This outcome is perversely irrational precisely because the current state of transgendered
jurisprudence is irrational.

Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33.
37 Luke Boso, A (Trans)gender-Inclusive Equal Protection Analysis of Public Female Toplessness, 18 LAW & SEXUALITY 143, 15758 (2009).
38 See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
39 Id. at 828
40 Id.
41 Id.at 829.
42 In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832; Boso, supra note 37, at 158.
43 Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
44 Greenberg, supra note 14, at 303.
35
36
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In In re Estate of Gardiner, J’Noel Gardiner was a transgendered woman whose husband’s
family petitioned to deny J’Noel any right to her husband’s inheritance after his death.45 Mr.
Gardiner’s family argued that because J’Noel was never a woman, she was not legally married to
Mr. Gardiner.46 The court held that the marriage was invalid, and J’Noel had no right to Mr.
Gardiner’s estate.47 The court reasoned that despite J’Noel’s sex reassignment surgery, hormone
replacement therapy, electrolysis, and tracheal shave, that J’Noel’s gender was male, because this
was her gender assigned at birth.48
Lastly, in Kantaras v. Kantaras, Respondent Michael had sex- reassignment surgery and
transitioned from FTM prior to meeting his wife Linda, Petitioner.49 Linda knew Michael was
transgendered prior to marrying him.50 Linda birthed a child via artificial insemination from
Michael’s brother’s sperm three years into her marriage with Michael, and Michael adopted Linda’s
child born from a previous boyfriend a few months after marrying Linda.51 Michael petitioned for
divorce and for custody of both children.52 Linda claimed, though she had been married to
Michael for nine years, that the marriage was invalid because Michael was a woman.53 The court
held that the marriage was invalid and Michael was denied custody.54 The court reasoned that the
marriage was void because it involved members of the same sex, and despite Michael’s selfidentified gender, that the statutory meanings of male and female are those, “immutable traits
determined at birth.”55

In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 120 (Kan. 2002).
Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 156 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. (In divorce and custody cases, one tactic utilized to gain custody of a child is for a party to use someone’s
transgendered status to nullify the marriage and, therefore, their custodial rights).
54 Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 162.
55 Id.
45
46
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Although the rule that biologically determined sex controls gender identity has been largely
abandoned, several state courts and statutes continue to focus on gonads, external sex
characteristics, and even the ability to procreate or consummate the marriage to determine
marriage validity.56 It is important to notice in the next section that the argument that the ability to
consummate a marriage is a legitimate threshold for validating a marriage closely parallels the
reasoning in transgender marital cases focusing on biological sex. Each is grounded in malecentric notions of gender and gender stereotypes.
B. Ability to Sexually Consummate Marriage: A Determinative Factor in Considering the Legality of
Transgendered Marriage
Some courts have shifted the focus from the pure-biology rationale adopted from Corbett57
to a focus on external designees of sex and gender: gonads and sexual intercourse. One seminal
case that used ability to consummate as a factor in upholding a marriage between a transgendered
person and a non-transgendered party was M.T. v. J.T, a 1987 New Jersey case.58 Here, M tried to
annul the marriage to J, because J was, according to M, “not a woman.”59 J’s genitalia had to be
examined, and J’s doctor testified that J had sex-reassignment surgery, and that her genitalia were
identical to female genitalia.60 Notably, the doctor also testified that J was able to have normative
heterosexual intercourse.61 The court held that the marriage was valid, reasoning that the best test
was to determine if a person’s anatomy matched his or her perceived gender, then this was the
person’s “true sex.”62 Here, the court expressly rejects Corbett.63 Thus, if a person undertakes
gender-reassignment surgery and can engage in hetero- normative sex, then that person may legally
marry, but only someone of his or her opposite gender.
Newlin, supra note 15, at 468-69.
Corbett, (1970) 2 All E.R. 33.
58 M. T. v. J. T., 355 A.2d 204, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
59 M. T., 355 A.2d at 211.
60 Id.
61 M. T., 355 A.2d at 211.
62 Id.; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 301.
63 In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 125.
56
57
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Under this definition, essentially a marriage between a post-operative MTF transgendered
person and a non-transgendered female would be null, precisely because this would be considered
a same-sex marriage. Notably, in M.T. v. J.T., J had sex reassignment surgery after marrying M.T.,
and M.T. paid for the surgery.64 However, M.T. was employing a common tactic used by parties in
divorce cases: using biological gender as a weapon to invalidate marriage and obtain custody.
Also compare B. v. B, where Mark was a FTM transgendered man who underwent hormone
replacement therapy and a hysterectomy and mastectomy, but had not had sex-reassignment
surgery.65 Mark married a woman who believed he was a man at the time of the marriage.66 The
wife later moved for annulment on the grounds of sexual incapacity, which were valid grounds for
petitioning for dissolution of marriage at that time in New York.67 Ultimately, the court held that
the marriage was invalid.68 It reasoned that because Mark lacked the male genitalia necessary for
penetrative intercourse, he could not fulfill the obligations and duties of a husband.69 Specifically,
the court found he did not have the “necessary apparatus to enable defendant to function as a
man for the purposes of procreation.”70
The B Court openly controls gender based on the ability to procreate and fulfill heteronormative gender roles, limiting the construction of gender in a traditional patriarchal framework,
while also demanding that transgender people choose medical alteration of their bodies in
exchange for legal rights. This case demonstrates the encroachment into privacy and self-identity
the court is willing to make in order to perpetuate a binary gender system one in which biology is
monolithic.

M.T., 355 A.2d. at 205.
B v. B, 355 N.Y.S. 2d 712, 715 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
66 Id. at 713.
67 Id. at 717.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 B v. B, 355 N.Y.S. 2d at 717; Greenberg, supra note 14, at 303.
64
65
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Similarly, some courts are creating a pathway to validating transgendered marriage (and
control the definition of “marriage”) by using rigid, gender-controlling mechanisms such as gender
marker changes on legal documents and sex-reassignment surgery. And for some courts still,
sexual reassignment surgery or changing the gender on legal documents is not enough to legally
recognize self-identified gender.
C. Gender Marker Changes and Sex Reassignment Surgery as the Thresholds for Legal Marriage
Several American courts have adopted a framework to adjudicate the legality of
transgendered marriage based on formal mechanisms. The first of these are state mechanisms,
whereby a transgendered person can apply for name and gender changes on legal documents such
as birth certificates, passports, and drivers licenses. Though not every state will grant these
requests71, and some states require a doctor’s approval in writing, proof of hormone therapy, or of
sex-reassignment surgery. A name change usually requires petitioning for the amendment in
probate court. Some courts then recognize these amended legal documents as the procedural
threshold for that person’s self-identified gender to be legally recognized.
Next are informal medical mechanisms, whereby a person can engage in sex/gender
reassignment surgery and hormone replacement therapy.72 Some courts require that sexreassignment surgery occur prior to changing the gender designation on a person’s birth
certificate.73 Still other courts refuse to recognize self-identified gender even when someone seeks
remedy through legal document changes and sex-reassignment surgery.
It is significant that these mechanisms have personal and monetary costs, and can be
“outing” events. And, their coercive nature is taxing: demanding that a transgendered person
Lambda Legal, Changing Birth Certificate Designations: State-by-State Guidelines, (February 2, 2015),
http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/transgender/changing-birth-certificate-sex-designations.
72. Alice Newlin, Should A Trip from Illinois to Tennessee Change A Woman into A Man? : Proposal for A Uniform Interstate Sex
Reassignment Recognition Act, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 461, 468-69 (2008) (discussing how courts in New Jersey and
California have ruled that transgendered people legally acquire their post operative sex).
73 “Advising Transgender Clients” NTFAM MA-CLE 395.
71

14

modify his or her body, undergo a name change, or designate one of two genders on legal
documents carries costs. Further, these changes are required irrespective of whether sex
reassignment or a specific gender marker is an accurate designation and whether such changes are
desired —all simply to gain legal recognition and rights. A person must submit to the binary,
and/or physically modify his or her body for legal privileges. This forced choice is a clear
illustration of the coercive power over how gender is formed and identified. The following cases
demonstrate how these factors act as thresholds to validating or invalidating marriage and the
resulting prevarication of justice.
In In re Marriage of Nash, a 2003 Ohio case, the Petitioner, a FTM post-operative
transgendered man, sought a marriage license, which did not issue because he omitted his previous
marriage (when he was legally female) from his application; an evidentiary hearing was held to
determine petitioner Nash’s gender. 74 When previously living as a male, Nash had sex
reassignment surgery and had the gender markers changed from female to male on his driver’s
license and Massachusetts-issued birth certificate.75 However, the Ohio court held that it was not
error to deny Nash a marriage license.76 It reasoned that Nash’s gender was a legal impediment to
issuing the marriage license.77 It further noted that since every petition for a marriage license in
Ohio is subject to scrutiny, Nash’s license was treated like every other petition for a license, and
thus no equal protection violation occurred.78 Additionally, Nash’s Massachusetts birth certificate
was only prima facie evidence of the facts recorded on the certificate itself.79 Essentially, the gender
change on Nash’s Massachusetts birth certificate need not be recognized as fact, just evidence to
weigh against the female gender indicated on his original birth certificate— what the court
In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003 Ohio 7221 (Ohio Ct. App, 2003).
Id. at 2, ¶4.
76 Id. at 49.
77 Id. at 20-23.
78 Id. at 49.
79 In re Nash, 2003 Ohio 7221 at 26.
74
75
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considered his “real” gender.80 And, because Ohio has a clear public policy prohibiting same sex
marriage, the amended birth certificate need not be given full faith and credit under Ohio law. 81
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this case echoes the earlier Ohio case: In re Ladrach82, where a person’s
gender is largely biologically determined according to Ohio courts.
Similarly in the 2005 Illinois case In re Marriage of Simmons, the Petitioner was FTM, had his
internal sex organs removed, but still maintained external female genitalia.83 The Appellate Court
upheld the trial court’s finding that the marriage was invalid, and upheld the lower court’s
termination of the father’s parental rights.84 The Appellate Court reasoned that because the
petitioner retained his female genitalia, that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
have determined that he was legally female.85 It further reasoned that, “the mere issuance of a new
birth certificate cannot, legally speaking, make petitioner a male.”86 Here, it is evident that the
Court was looking for a modification of genitalia to “match” the Petitioner’s self-identified gender
in order to render the marriage, custody of his child, and the Petitioner’s gender legally valid.
Simmons87 is a complete and gross distortion of justice: although Petitioner used his birth certificate
to establish his gender with the Court, the Court moved the ball, thereby denying him a legal
remedy. There was no avenue for which Petitioner could establish his gender, other than having
sex reassignment surgery.
In Littleton v. Prange, an especially egregious Texas case that came down in 1999, Christie,
post-operative MTF, was not permitted to bring a wrongful death action after her spouse’s death.88

In re Nash, 2003 Ohio 7221 at 26.
Id. at 29.
82 In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 828.
83 In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d 942, 946 (1st Dist. 2005).
84 Id. at 956. (Notably, the doctor in this case testified that additional surgeries were needed before the petitioner could
completely be sexually reassigned, and therefore he was truly still female).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 In re Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 946.
88 Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999).
80
81
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The Appellate Court held that she was legally male and therefore had no standing because she was
not a surviving spouse under the law: the long-term marriage was invalid.89 Christie and her
husband Jonathon married in Kentucky, and later moved to Texas.90 During the marriage, they
filed joint tax returns and engaged in sexual intercourse.91 During the trial for the wrongful death
suit, Christie changed her gender designation on her birth certificate from male to female, which
the trial court recognized.92 On appeal however, the court found that the trial court had
erroneously interpreted the Texas statute governing amendments to birth certificates.93 It
reasoned that the statute only contemplated amendments to correct inaccuracies at the time of
birth.94 Justice Hardberger asked, “Can a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel,
drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”95 The
Appellate Court sided with biology, rejecting both gender marker changes and sexual reassignment
surgery as indicative of legally valid gender.
The Littleton case brings the three-part framework full circle, and demonstrates a
jurisprudence in flux; one that is desperately clinging to controlling gender and the institution of
marriage through a rigid formulation of what constitutes legal gender, and thereby marriage. Next,
the three-part framework will be used to analyze the way in which gender formation and identity is
controlled and gender stereotypes perpetuated by the jurisprudence of transgendered marriage.
II. BINARY SEX-CLASSIFIED GENDER THRESHOLDS REINFORCE
TRADITIONAL HETERO-NORMATIVE GENDER ROLES IN SOCIETY
A. Controlling Gender Identity and Gender Roles Through the Law
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The three-part framework is partly used to explore the case law that comprises transgender
jurisprudence, and it also serves as a tool to expose the law’s control over both gender formation
and gender roles in society. To begin, looking at the Anonymous case, the first in American
transgender jurisprudence, the court relied on the gender binary and biology to refute the
mutability of gender through hormones or surgery.96 This reliance on the gender binary and
biology signals that American courts reject self-identified gender, and instead value heteronormative constructions of gender, which are firmly entrenched in the patriarchal tradition.
Defining gender based upon the notion that sex is immutable at birth, forecasts gender, and
purposefully makes gender rigid, not fluid. It fails to place gender on a continuum, and forces the
law’s analytic framework and conception of gender to focus on gonadal, chromosomal, and genital
tests. In essence, in accordance with the law, gender is not chosen; rather, it is predetermined at
birth. This predetermination squarely places gender in the hands of the doctor, of society, of law
—everyone but the person. By doing so, the law demands gender identity formation in strict
conformance with gender stereotypes and hetero-normative qualities. Thus, gender is grounded
in pre-determined characteristics immutably given at birth because of one’s gonads. The resulting
stereotypes based on a gender binary are thus inevitable and held sacred: ‘Girls are bad at math,
boys are good at science’; ‘Boys will be boys;’ and, ‘Girls should play with dolls, boys should play
with trucks.’ The stereotypes are endless, and yet all constrained to the gender binary.
In addition, by focusing on biology, the law places preference on hetero-normative
stereotypes of gender to which people must conform. The law does so by using the circular logic
that we must use hetero-normative stereotypes because these characteristics originate in our
biological makeup; they are predetermined. The law assumes a hetero-normative endpoint, and
thus people who do not neatly fit into the “normal” framework are cast as deviant, perverse, and
96
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beyond the law’s protection.97 Therefore, unless a person fits the law’s binary conception of
gender, they will not be afforded legal-rights, like the ability to marry. Thus, we see self-identified
heterosexual couples denied marriage because one party is transgendered, and simultaneously see
same-sex couples’ marriages upheld when the parties married as a legal male and a legal female,
and then one party transitions to the same gender as the other spouse later during the marriage.
Additionally, cases like Anonymous and B v. B, further demonstrate the law’s preference for
hetero-normative gender by focusing on penetrative sex.98 These cases strictly enforce what is
considered “normal” or protected sex under the law, and that which is deviant. Thus, for a
marriage to be valid, a man must be able to penetrate, and a woman must be able to receive
vaginal penetration. Therefore, hetero-normative sex is valued as quintessential to marriage.99
This value judgment serves to reinforce traditional gender roles where women should be able to
please a man during marriage by having sexual intercourse, as well as serve her core function: to
produce progeny— a perverse throwback to Henry VIII perhaps. In turn, men must be able to
perform sexual intercourse in order to provide a woman with the ability to fulfill the motherhood
role. At their core, these cases insidiously reinforce the necessity of women to be able to sexually
pleasure and procreate for their husbands. And though failure to consummate remains valid
grounds to invalidate marriage in some states100, affecting hetero-normative and transgendered
couples alike, simply because it also affects heterosexuals does not make it less biased. Failure to
consummate as part of transgendered marriage jurisprudence still demonstrates a legal protection
for the necessity of sexual intercourse during marriage.
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This focus on consummation is incredibly controlling on gender and freedom.101 One
logical step beyond consummation is the ability to produce a child— alsoan aspect used to
invalidate transgendered marriages. It should be noted that marriage among heterosexual couples
are not invalidated because one party cannot produce progeny. Thus, we see transgendered
people being held to a higher and therefore inequitable standard, as courts again focus on what is
naturally determined as opposed to what is self-identified.
Courts in cases such as Nash, Simmons, and Prange, control gender conformation by either
accepting or rejecting legal and medical mechanisms used to establish self-identified gender. 102
Specifically, these cases evaluate legal documents and actual body modification; arguably, the most
clear illustration of how the law controls gender. Thus, courts concomitantly control gender while
also rejecting self-identified gender, thereby creating schizophrenic jurisprudence as varying states
validate and invalidate gender disparately.103 By requiring that a person medically alter his or her
body, courts are forecasting that for self-identified gender to be legally recognized in marriage,
genitalia and self-identified gender must conform. This requires a transgendered person who does
not identify as either gender or perhaps as poly-gender to identify within the binary: ‘Check a box:
male or female.’104 This is identity stripping because it forces a transgendered person who may not
wish to alter his or her body and undergo an expensive or risky medical procedure to do just that.
It also requires a transgendered person to conform to the gender binary and thus heteronormative stereotypes of gender: if you identify as female, you cannot have a penis and you must
marry a man, and if you identify as male, you must have a penis, and you cannot marry a man.
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And, you must identify as either male or female only. This gender-molding reinforces stereotypes
of what bodies should look like: matching genitalia and gender are required for legal affirmation.
Thus, the law bends and mutates the existing gender continuum by placing a collar around
the neck of gender; thereby exposing the law’s proclivity for the male-dominated tradition of
defining gender through the binary.
B. Harm Caused by Defining Gender Based on Sexual Prowess and Legal Designations
At its core, controlling gender through legal designations, sexual reassignment procedures,
consummation, and biology, does what some deem to be violence to the transgendered
community and thereby society.105 Because the ways in which courts recognize legal gender are
rigid, they force people into identifying their gender in ways that may conflict with their sense of
self. This rigidity ultimately strips the transgendered person of fundamental personhood and
dignity. This denial in turn allows the law to demand that transgendered people perpetuate a fraud
upon themselves and society by checking a box, having a surgery, or marrying the opposite sex in
order to be legally, and perhaps socially, validated. It denies that gender can vary throughout a
lifetime, and that gender may be poly or none.106 The binary does not account for some FTM’s
who want to have facial hair and give birth to a child, or have a mastectomy but not genital
reassignment surgery. So while some courts provide a pathway by which transgendered people
can validly marry, the path is paved with briars and glass, reflecting only two options: male or
female. In short, this stripping of personhood is harmful and denigrating and should not remain
part of modern jurisprudence.
Further, by using consummation as a threshold for validating marriage, this jurisprudence is
inherently oppressive to women. Requiring consummation objectifies a woman as a sex object first

105
106

Lloyd, supra note 97, at 157.
Vade, supra note 4, at 267.

21

and foremost. She must be able to please her man and provide the sexualem cupientibus107 necessary
for a “good, normal marriage.” This threshold also establishes hetero-normative sex as the gold
standard. Often, courts control a woman’s sex and control gender, demanding that both conform
to traditional patriarchal notions of the normal and the good in order to receive legal protections.
It is no surprise to see this philosophy born out in transgendered jurisprudence.
Lastly, for those transgendered persons who wish to engage in sexual reassignment surgery
or to obtain gender marker changes, both sexual reassignment surgery and gender-marker changes
require a certain social-economic prowess. First, your state must have providers who will provide
hormone therapy, gender-reassignment, and psychological services. In addition, you must have
the financial capacity to pay for these medical procedures. For example, sexual reassignment
surgery can be upwards of $30,000.00 and is not covered by health insurance.108 Similarly, the fees
associated with a name change, birth certificate amendment, and social security gender marker
amendment, can be economically prohibitive if taken in totality, assuming a person wants all
genders to match on his or her legal documents. This requires time and money. Thus, by
requiring these modifications, which have financial components, the law is controlling gender by
not recognizing that these procedures and amendments should be publicly and privately
subsidized.109 Further, as discussed in Part IIC, even for those transgendered persons with the
economic means to alter gender markers and undergo sexual reassignment surgery, courts may not
recognize these changes as modifying their gender assigned at birth.110 The inequities are endless
in this labyrinth of laws constructed to protect the gender binary.
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IV. THE UNDERCURRENT OF BAIS AND PATRIARCHAL CONTROL OVER THE
MANNER IN WHICH COURTS DEFINE SEX AND GENDER
By acknowledging that the law controls gender formation and identity and the resultant
harm of that control, the web of bias and patriarchy that permeates transgendered jurisprudence is
exposed. The relationship between bias and patriarchy is closely interwoven, and thus I will
discuss them in tandem. Requiring gender to be defined solely within the binary implicates favor
for hetero-normative gender stereotypes at a basic level. The tradition of defining gender based
upon external factors, rather than internal identity, is simplistic and uniform, non-threatening, and
easily controlled. Conversely, recognizing the gender continuum tugs at traditional masculinity,
mutates it, inverts it, and perhaps destroys it. Using marriage as a mechanism to ratify the gender
binary simultaneously denies the validity of self-identified gender in no uncertain terms. This
framework serves only to protect men who value traditional masculinity and traditional gender
roles. Rather than recognize a more relational concept of gender that allows people to selfidentify, patriarchy maintains rigid categories of gender in the law and society.
Further, making marriage gendered is inherently patriarchal. Marriage, at its advent, was
used to reinforce the notion that women and children were property and provided legal and socialinstitutional order by recognizing future legatees.111 By continuing to define marriage as the union
between a man and a woman, and then further controlling the way in which the law legally
validates whether a person is a man or a woman, the law utilizes marriage as a proxy to control
gender conformity. Simply put, if a transgendered person wants to marry, he or she must conform
to the law’s definition of and the courts’ interpretation of his or her self-identified gender. Tying
gender to the goal of marriage exerts control in a perverse way and effectively uses marriage as a
club to beat someone’s gender into “normal” shape.
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Lastly, transgendered jurisprudence serves men by using marriage as a proxy to control
gender and maintain white-male dominated notions of gender. Wherein marriage reinforces
traditional gender roles, the way that bodies should look, and perhaps most damning, that the
ability to have sexual intercourse and procreate are prerequisites for valid marriage. These
thresholds control gender roles, gender identity, and gender freedom. Because these mechanisms
are a perversion, we naturally find that the state of the jurisprudence of transgendered marriage is
one in flux. As social awareness of the gender continuum grows, courts are flailing for
justifications to define gender rigidly. Thus, no sound, uniform body of law exists. Failure to
achieve uniformity perpetuates inequality, confusion, and chaos. It further evidences a
jurisprudence that is not on firm footing in the law, regardless of its reliance on science— an everchanging field. The present state of transgendered jurisprudence places transgendered people in
the unique position of having their personhood controlled, discriminated against, and denied.
There is no rational basis to justify the reason for this to be the case, and thus we see the harm
that patriarchy continues to perpetuate on society without justification. Gender must be divorced
from marriage.
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CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence of transgendered marriage must change. As marriage equality and
nonconforming gender becomes more publicly prevalent, the bias that permeates the United
States legal system’s treatment of transgendered marriage should be diminished. The law’s use of
biology, sexual consummation, gender marker changes, and sexual reassignment surgery as
thresholds to validate marriage perpetuates discrimination against transgendered persons who wish
to marry. These thresholds present equal protection concerns and causes social harm. Perhaps
more insidious is that these thresholds born out of the case law, are reinforced as legitimate
through a patriarchal lens and demand conformity to the gender binary. Transgendered marriage
threatens traditional gender roles, masculinity, and a white male dominated conception of the way
in which gender is formed or determined. This patriarchal approach should be smashed. Such an
approach denies personhood and dignity at a basic level. It denies people the legitimacy to live and
marry as they choose. It is not simply imperfect justice, it is immoral and against the ethos of our
constitutional principles. The basis for validating marriage in the wake of laws prohibiting samesex marriage creates additional conditions for transgendered persons in an effort to exclude nontraditional participants from an institution that some consider to be traditional and sacred.
Regardless, marrying is a right, and self-identity is sacred, and to deny either is wrong.
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